Will Iran-Saudi relations improve in 2015?

“Several factors have led to this moment,” Sigurd Neubauer, the non-resident fellow at the Persian Gulf states Institute in Washington, said in an article, appeared in the latest edition of the Foreign Policy.

He added that the first reason for the change in Iran-Saudi Arabia relation was the election of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013.

Since elected, said the analyst, President Rouhani has initiated a policy “aimed at reducing tensions between Tehran and several of its Persian Gulf neighbors. Iran's foreign minister even arrived in the kingdom for a rare visit to the regional rival, expressing condolences after the death of King Abdullah.”

The late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud died on January 23, 2015. He was buried in an unmarked grave on January 24. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was one of the first world leaders to arrive for the late king’s burial ceremony.

As the second factor effective for improvement of Tehran-Riyadh relations, Neubauer referred to the ‘interim nuclear agreement,’ “which undermined the kingdom’s standing as the region’s de facto powerhouse and raised Iran’s stature as a rising international power.”

“Next came the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) tromping through Iraq and Syria, a threat to both Iran and Saudi Arabia and its conservative Wahhabi clerical establishment,' argued the Washington-based analyst.

“Meanwhile, apparent US fatigue with the Middle East left the Persian Gulf countries without much US support. And, recognizing Iran’s superior position, they had no choice but to start making nice with Iran.”

The author referred to the succession of a new Saudi King to the throne (King Salman) as the final key factor for Iran-Saudi Arabia ties.

“However, despite the emergence of shared interests, including defeating ISIS, it is unrealistic to expect that all this will translate into an immediate thaw in Saudi-Iranian relations, given the hostility that has accumulated since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the strategic considerations that will still guide the two countries,” Neubauer argued.

He touched upon the Saudi-Iranian “worsening” relations “for a long time,” especially during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

“For the Sunni Arab monarchies, the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran was galling,” said the analyst accusing the former Iranian chief administrator of making “poisonous rhetoric.”

“The Arab Spring,” (better known as the Islamic Awakening) “which seemed to undermine the old Middle Eastern political and sectarian balance, heightened tensions. Not helping matters was Tehran’s support for Syria’s embattled Bashar al-Assad regime and for the former Nouri al-Maliki regime in Iraq. By late last year, Iran and its allies seemed to have the upper hand in both countries, as well as in Lebanon and Yemen.”

Neubauer added that under the late Saudi king, Riyadh worked “behind the scenes to rein in Iran’s influence” while officially maintaining cordial relations with Tehran.

“Saudi Arabia used soft power and hard currency as part of this effort while deploying its military against real or perceived Iranian involvement in Bahrain and Yemen. For its part, Tehran preferred to maintain cordial relations with Riyadh, too, while trying to undermine its rival” in different ways.

The Middle East analyst also accused Iran of making “covert attacks” against Saudi Arabia, including allegedly attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 2011 and launching targeted cyberattacks against Aramco facilities and Saudi government websites.”

However, he noted, “Things began to change immediately following the election of Rouhani. The new leader began a campaign to end Iran’s regional and international isolation and, especially, the economic sanctions on the country. He did so by trying to drive a wedge between the country’s enemies and reduce tensions between Iran and several of the Persian Gulf states.

“First, he exploited existing differences between some of the smaller Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to prevent them from forming a united front against Iran by attempting to convince them that times are changing and they are better off having good relations with Iran.”

Referring to Saudi Arabia as “Iran’s most significant ideological and religious competitor,” Neubauer said, “At the same time, it was important for Iran to change its negative image, and for that, the country had to grow closer, albeit in a restrained way, to the Persian Gulf countries.”

He said Iran’s initiated policy to establish constructive interaction with other regional states, “included several visits abroad by the Iranian president and foreign minister, interviews and articles placed in the Persian Gulf media outlets, statements about the need for unity and cooperation in the Muslim world, and even a series of trade and tourism agreements with several countries in the region.”

“Just before Iran and the P5+1 negotiators signed the interim nuclear agreement in late 2013, which was extended again in late 2014, Tehran attempted to ease the tension,” said the Middle East analyst.

He referred to an article written by Foreign Minister Zarif in a pan-Arab newspaper, in which the Iranian minister had “called on his neighbors to build a new regional order free from external intervention.

“The presence of foreign forces has historically resulted in domestic instability within the countries hosting them and exacerbated the existing tensions between these countries and other regional states,” Zarif had written in his article.

Referring to the developments in Iraq and Syria, Neubauer said, under the present circumstance, many in the Persian Gulf felt concerned that rebels will not be able to defeat Assad and that might “lead Riyadh to strike a deal with Iran (and Assad’s other patron, Russia) on Syria’s political future.

“Rapprochement between the leader of the Sunni front and the leader of the Shiite front may also affect the situation in Iraq. Meanwhile, quiet coordination between Saudi Arabia and Iran has already led to the election of a new prime minister in Iraq and could also help in the fight against ISIS.”

“The Persian Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, might want to tacitly (and tactically) cooperate with Iran to make sure that the radical ISIS crosses no further borders. The two countries have proven in the past that they are pragmatic and willing to adjust their positions when required by the circumstances.”

Accordingly, argued the Middle East analyst, “at the meeting between Zarif and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal on the sidelines of the September 2014 UN Security Council session, Zarif heralded “a new page in relations between the two countries.” Faisal was more cautious, focusing his remarks on the need to join forces against ISIS, noting, “We believe we must avoid the errors of the past to successfully confront the current crisis.”

“At high-level talks about ISIS, however, discussions of oil prices seem to have interfered. A two-day meeting hosted by Oman in December 2014 reportedly broke up in acrimony, with Saudi and Iranian delegates at odds over the slump in oil prices.”

“The current price plunge has been driven by Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s dominant power. Although it is true that Riyadh’s energy policy partially responds to the fracking revolution in North America, the greater motivation is, perhaps, breaking Iran’s will and, with it, putting a brake on its regional ambitions. A number of Saudi decision-makers seem to believe that the oil price drop is therefore serving the kingdom’s interests by hurting the already battered Iranian economy.

“Iran and Saudi Arabia have adopted mixed foreign policies that include elements of both cooperation and conflict. With this approach, they can slowly improve relations across the Persian Gulf while also maintaining their regional might.

“The two new-old partners have a long road to travel before they reach a historic reconciliation.”
/SR