The 11th Summit of the Developing Eight Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8), a coalition of Islamic countries has been held in Cairo. This group, comprising Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Bangladesh, includes some of the most significant Islamic nations—excluding Saudi Arabia.

The D-8 was founded 27 years ago as an economic coalition, initiated by Necmettin Erbakan, the Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey. The motivation behind this group was its shared "Islamic identity," and Erbakan hoped that such a union would lay the groundwork for a strong Islamic bloc in the world.

From its inception in 1997, ambitious goals were established, such as "peace instead of conflict," "dialogue instead of confrontation," and "cooperation instead of exploitation." However, nearly three decades later, not only have these goals gone unrealized, but many developments have directly contradicted them.

Challenges in Achieving Strategic Cooperation

For instance, the often competition between Iran and Turkey—two key members of the coalition—has never risen to the level of strategic cooperation beyond occasional, necessary collaborations due to geographic proximity. Their different stances during the Syrian crisis, one of the most significant regional challenges of recent decades, further exemplify this failure.

Similarly, despite being members of the same coalition, Egypt and Iran have not restored official diplomatic relations even after four decades. The D-8 has also been unable to bridge this gap.

Economic relations within the D-8, while present, have primarily progressed through bilateral agreements rather than through the framework of the group itself.

The Limits of Shared Islamic Identity

These realities highlight a critical point: while a "shared Islamic identity" may theoretically serve as a unifying force, the practical experience of the D-8 and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) suggests that "Islamic identity" lacks the institutional and guiding capacity to establish foundational cooperation among Islamic states. Instead, it has often been reduced to ceremonial rhetoric, and Islamic summits have rarely gone beyond gatherings.

Several factors contribute to this failure:

1. Lack of Consensus on Islamic Identity
"Islamic identity" is not a tangible factor but a broad, abstract concept. Even among major Islamic powers, there is no consensus on its definition. Instead, paradoxical interpretations and categorizations—such as "Wahhabi Islam", "Safavid Islam," and "Ottoman Islam"—have often influenced relations, creating more division than unity.


2. External Influences and Power Dynamics
Historically, international relations among Islamic countries, particularly during the Cold War, were shaped by the power dynamics of major global players. In the post-Cold War unipolar order, the influence of the U.S. has played a direct or indirect role in guiding these relationships. Today, alliances with the U.S. significantly shape the foreign policies of many Islamic countries.

Even when opportunities for independent action arise, longstanding rivalries and conflicting interests among these nations often counteract the possibility of "Islamic convergence."


3. Modern International Relations and the Decline of Identity-Based Agency
In modern international relations, the role of identity-based factors—whether ethnic or religious—has significantly diminished. Instead, a network of shared "interests," particularly economic ones, drives relations. Without such shared interests, countries lack a common modern language for deep engagement. Economic interests often pave the way for broader geopolitical goals, as seen in the emergence of actors like Qatar and the UAE.


The Impact of External Forces

However, even economic interests often align with the broader influence of global powers like the U.S. For example, when a country like Iran operates outside the dominant international order, it faces political and economic sanctions that hinder its ability to form effective alliances. This is why a country like Azerbaijan finds cooperation with Israel more beneficial than strengthening ties with Iran.

In contrast, "Turkish Islam" and "Saudi Islam," aligned with the aforementioned dynamics, have managed to enhance their roles as independent actors within the international system. However, even these forms of "Islamic identity" risk isolation if they step outside the established order.

Conclusion

The failure of "Islamic identity" as a guiding principle was evident during the Gaza crisis, where none of the three key factors—economic, security, or political interests—enabled Islamic countries to effectively address the situation. This underscores the reality that "Islamic identity," despite its theoretical potential, remains largely ineffective in shaping the collective interests or actions of Islamic states.