Four important technical achievements in Iran’s nuclear programs

1- Iran has made it to install more second generation centrifuges in Natanz. This is important because the second generations of centrifuges are almost three times more powerful than the first generation. Islamic Republic of Iran, under the supervision of IAEA experts and within exact framework of IAEA rules, including nuclear safeguards, started the installation of second generation of centrifuges in Natanz.

In the last report of the IAEA it was mentioned that Iran had installed 180 of cascades in Natanz while according to the recent report by Amano the number has risen to 689. It means that Iran has promoted its qualitative and quantitative enrichment power within a short time.

In the report by Amano, it was stressed that at the moment a sum of 13555 centrifuges are installed in Natanz, which is 886 more in comparison with the previous report.

In doing so Iran seems to pursue two objectives, first to prove the western side that political sanctions to freeze Iran’s nuclear developments have been futile. Second Iran intends to increase its enrichment power in a bid to increase its political bargaining power in future talks.

2- According to the report by Amano, Iran has continued its production of uranium oxide. Since transforming uranium gas to solid uranium oxide to produce fuel plates will not provide any excuse to western propagandists, this is counted a positive step for Iran in trust building.

Of course since conversion of 20 per cent enriched uranium to uranium oxide for production of fuel plates practically undermines the possibility to produce nuclear bombs, western media tried to induce the meaning that the issue can bring a temporary immunity because the process is likely to change to opposite. It is ignored that at the moment Iran does not have the technology to retransform uranium oxide placed in fuel plates to its original form and this type of propaganda is only meant to undermine the peaceful purposes of Iran’s nuclear activities.

3- Amano, in his 14-page report, submitted in May 2013, stressed the development of the project in Arak. IR 40 reactor in Arak is an average heavy water research reactor designed to include 150 natural uranium. According to this report the following main parts are installed in IR 40 reactor:

Mobile crane, moderators and heat convertors plus cooling systems, cleaning and circuit wiring systems, moderator storage tanks, pressure controllers for cooling systems in reactor. On 6 May 2013, IAEA performed a verification of designing information in IR 40 in Arak to find that the reactor hauls including control room facilities, fuel restoration machines and reactor cooling pumps have been received but not installed yet. During the verification of designing information Iran confirmed the following processes for installation of IR 40 reactors:

First phase: Before installation (using synthetic fuel complexes and light water) in the last quarter of 2013;
Second phase: Installation (using real fuel complexes and heavy water) during the first quarter of 2014; which is expected to be in operation in the third quarter of 2014.

4- Increasing 5 per cent uranium stock is the fourth change in Iran’s nuclear program which has been reported by IAEA. In this regard Amano’s report notes that:
“Since Iran has started uranium enrichment in its nuclear facilities, it has produced the following materials:

“8960 kilograms of 5 per cent enriched UF6 (689 kilograms more than previous report)
6357 kilograms of U235 (383 kilograms more than previous report)

Whyness of Iran-IAEA unfruitful talks

Director General of IAEA refers to ten rounds of fruitless talks between Iran and IAEA without mentioning the real achievements some even imperfectly and inaccurately pictured.

This report, without reflecting the discussions and agreements between IAEA and Iranian negotiators and without the least reference to active cooperation of Iran, merely expresses that Iran banned access to Parchin and that there has been no agreement for future agenda or new modalities.

It has to be mentioned that before the beginning of the first round of talks, principles for talks including security considerations of the country, respecting modality 711, discussing and wrapping of the issues one by one, providing documents and alleged evidences, independence of the negotiating team, timing and quality of discussing the issues were included in a preliminary negotiation for a final agreement by two sides.

Contrary to this agreement, IAEA has neither agreed to submit the alleged evidences nor accepted to close the discussion of Parchin once it visits the military non-nuclear site.

This is the least expected from the Director General of an international organization, like International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who has to stay neutral in its reports and follow the articles of statute of IAEA in his reports.

This is while pressure by the US and its allies in Amano’s report, particularly in the parts on alleged accusations against Iran is quite apparent.

HK